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MCCRORY V. HARRIS:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS
ON RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS AND
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
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REDISTRICTING
ALEX DIETZ*
INTRODUCTION
Every ten years, states are required to draw new electoral districts.
State legislatures across the country draw new district lines based on
many competing considerations, including race. The use of race in
redistricting is a contentious issue and poses many potential difficulties
for would-be map drawers. Redistricting plans must not rely on too
much race-based line drawing to avoid violating the Equal Protection
Clause in the Constitution,1 while at the same time also must rely on
enough to meet the requirements of the Voting Rights Act2 (VRA).
State plans are regularly challenged in court, with plaintiffs alleging the
state failed to strike the appropriate balance between too much and too
little use of race as a redistricting criteria. These challenges are a
daunting task for courts to resolve because they require careful
consideration of the often competing concerns of potential vote
dilution of minority voting strength, the relationship between politics
and race, the level of deference owed to state legislatures, the reliance
state legislatures place on the courts’ decisions, and how difficult it will
be for courts to evaluate future redistricting challenges.

Copyright © 2017 Alex Dietz.
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. 52 U.S.C. § 10101.
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In McCrory v. Harris,3 the Supreme Court must decide whether the
redistricting plan for North Carolina’s first and twelfth congressional
districts, CD1 and CD12, violates the Equal Protection Clause. The
First and Twelfth Congressional Districts in North Carolina have been
the subjects of numerous prior Supreme Court rulings regarding the
use of race in redistricting.4 Faced with another challenge to North
Carolina’s CD1 and CD12, the Court must determine that either the
North Carolina legislature struck the appropriate balance while relying
on race as a redistricting criterion, or produced a map with
impermissibly racially gerrymandered districts. This challenge is further
complicated by the fact that there is similar litigation currently in
progress in the North Carolina state court system that has resulted in
the opposite findings the lower court arrived at in McCrory.5
This Commentary argues that the Supreme Court should affirm
that both North Carolina’s CD1 and CD12 are the result of
impermissible racial gerrymanders in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. The procedural concerns raised by North Carolina concerning
the state court litigation do not justify any change to the Court’s
standard of review in this case. The Court should find both CD1 and
CD12 to be impermissible racial gerrymanders because the district
court’s findings that race predominated over traditional redistricting
criteria, and the district court’s conclusion that such predominance fails
strict scrutiny analysis, were not clear error.
I. FACTS
Following the 2010 decennial census, the North Carolina General
Assembly began drawing new congressional districts to adjust for
changes in population.6 The State House and Senate established
redistricting committees, which together were responsible for
preparing a plan for new congressional districts.7 The Chairmen of
these committees, Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis, hired Dr.

3. 136 S. Ct. 2512 (2016).
4. See Brief for Appellants at 5, McCrory v. Harris, NO. 15-1262 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2016)
[hereinafter Brief for Appellants] (“[T]his case marks the fifth occasion on which this Court has
considered racial gerrymandering challenges to North Carolina’s First and/or Twelfth Districts.”).
5. See Dickson v. Rucho, 781 S.E.2d 404, 410–11 (N.C. 2015) petition for cert. filed (U.S.
June 30, 2016) (No. 16-24) (“[W]e affirm the ruling of the three-judge panel that the predominant
factors in their creation were the traditional and permissible redistricting principles.”).
6. Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 8.
7. Id.
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Thomas Hofeller to design and draw the 2011 congressional plan.8 The
Chairmen provided the sole instructions for Dr. Hofeller about how to
redesign the electoral districts.9 The general priorities were to comply
with the one-person, one-vote requirement10 and to draw maps to favor
Republican candidates.11 For CD1, the specific instructions were to
draw CD1 “with a black voting-age population in excess of 50 percent
because of the Strickland case.”12 For CD12, the instructions were to
make CD12 a more Democratic district to “help Republican candidates
in the surrounding districts,”13 and not to “use race in any form except
perhaps with regard to Guilford County.”14
When the plan was made public, Senator Rucho and
Representative Lewis stated that they had intentionally made CD1 a
majority-minority district, and also stated that “because of the presence
of Guilford County in the Twelfth District, we have drawn our
proposed Twelfth District at a black voting age level that is above the
percentage of black voting age population found in the current Twelfth
District.”15 The plan raised the black voting age population (BVAP) in
CD1 from 47.76% to 52.65% and raised the BVAP in CD12 from
43.77% to 50.66%.16 The redistricting plan, including the new CD1 and
CD12 districts, was approved by the North Carolina legislature,
submitted to the DOJ for preclearance under section 5 of the VRA,
and was approved.17
The new maps faced almost immediate challenge in state court as
illegal racial gerrymanders.18 Multiple plaintiffs, including the North
Carolina Conference of Branches of the NAACP, challenged the plan,
and all of the challenges were consolidated in to one case.19 That case,
Dickson v. Rucho,20 has gone through the entirety of the state court

8. Id. at 9.
9. Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 607 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
10. Brief for Appellants, supra note 6, at 10. The 2010 census revealed that CD1 was
extremely under populated. Id.
11. Id.
12. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 613.
13. Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 10.
14. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 619 (emphasis in original).
15. Id. at 608 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
16. Brief for Appellees at 2, McCrory v. Harris, NO. 15-1262 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2016)
[hereinafter Brief for Appellees].
17. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 608–09.
18. Id. at 609.
19. Id.
20. 781 S.E.2d 404 (N.C. 2015) petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 30, 2016) (No. 16-24).
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system and was also heard by the Supreme Court.21 In Dickson, the
state trial court below found that CD1 had been drawn using race as
the predominant factor, but that it passed strict scrutiny, and that CD12
had not been drawn using race as the predominant factor, therefore
concluding that neither district was an impermissible gerrymander.22
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the district court’s findings,
and then reaffirmed after the United States Supreme Court vacated
that result.23 The plaintiffs in the state court litigation have petitioned
the United States Supreme Court again for certiorari,24 but the fate of
the state court litigation is likely to be bound up in the outcome of
McCrory.
McCrory began when Appellees David Harris and Christine
Bowser,25 registered voters in CD1 and CD12, respectively, claimed
that North Carolina used the VRA as a pretext to unconstitutionally
dilute minority voting strength by packing African Americans in to
CD1 and CD12.26 A three-judge panel presided over the trial, during
which substantial testimony was heard from Dr. Hofeller, the
Congressman representing CD1, the former Congressman representing
CD12, and from expert witnesses for each side.27
During his testimony, Dr. Hofeller admitted to implementing a
racial floor of fifty percent plus one person for CD1, and that
sometimes, while adding voters to CD1, “it wasn’t possible to adhere to
some of the traditional redistricting criteria.”28 Hofeller also testified
that while drawing CD12, he only viewed political data,29 but that “in
order to be cautious and draw a plan that would pass muster under the
Voting Rights Act, it was decided to reunite the black community in
Guilford County into the Twelfth.”30

21. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 609.
22. Id.
23. Id. The result was vacated so that the North Carolina Supreme Court could further
consider the matter in light of new doctrine in Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct.
1257 (2015).
24. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dickson v. Rucho, 781 S.E.2d 404 (N.C. 2015) (No. 14839).
25. Neither was a plaintiff in the state court litigation. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 609. In fact,
they did not even know the state case existed at the time they filed suit. Brief for Appellees, supra
note 16, at 52.
26. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 609.
27. Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 15.
28. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 611–12.
29. Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 10.
30. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 619.
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The panel also heard testimony from Congressman G.K.
Butterfield, representative of CD1, and former Congressman Mel Watt,
who formerly represented CD12.31 Both representatives had
tremendous success as the African-American preferred candidate in
their respective districts prior to the implementation of the 2011 plan,
even though neither district was a majority-minority district.32 Former
Congressman Watt also testified that Senator Rucho explicitly told him
that the goal for CD12 was to increase the BVAP “up to over 50 percent
to comply with the Voting Rights Law.”33
Both Appellants and Appellees offered expert reports and
testimony during the trial. Appellants offered reports prepared for the
State legislature concluding that racially polarized voting occurs in
North Carolina, and specifically in the counties and districts in and
around CD1.34 Appellees produced expert reports based on voter
registration data in support of the idea that race best explains the line
drawing in the 2011 version of CD12.35
Following the trial, the district court produced a lengthy opinion
holding North Carolina’s 2011 redistricting plan unconstitutional for
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and ordered the drawing of new districts.36 After denying a motion to
stay the district court’s order pending appeal,37 the Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction.38
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Both procedural law concerning collateral estoppel and the
standard of review, and substantive law concerning the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the VRA, are at
issue in McCrory.

31. Id. at 628 (Cogburn, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 606–07.
33. Id. at 617 (quotation marks omitted). Senator Rucho was present at the trial, but was
never called to testify to rebut this contention. Id. at 617–18.
34. Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 9.
35. See Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 620 (“This conclusion is further supported circumstantially
by the findings of the plaintiffs’ experts, Drs. Peterson and Ansolabehere.”).
36. Id. at 604.
37. McCrory v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 1001, 1001 (2016).
38. McCrory v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 2512, 2512 (2016).
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A. Procedural Law: Collateral Estoppel and the Standard of Review
The doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibits relitigation of issues
that have been decided in certain cases.39 Specifically, any issue of fact
or law decided in one case precludes the parties to that case from
relitigating the issue.40 In general, this preclusive effect applies to issues
decided in either federal or state courts.41 Collateral estoppel may not
be claimed against a party that did not have a “full and fair opportunity
to litigate that issue in the earlier case.”42
Review of a lower court’s factual findings is governed by Rule 52(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.43 A reviewing court must not
set aside factual findings unless they are “clearly erroneous.”44 This
means that the reviewing court may not set aside factual findings “[i]f
the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible . . . even though
convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact it would have
weighed the evidence differently.”45 This “clearly erroneous” standard
of review applies in cases concerning a finding of racial predominance,
even though obtaining a finding of racial predominance requires
meeting a demanding standard at the trial court level.46
B. Substantive Law: The Equal Protection Clause and the VRA
The Fourteenth Amendment was created with the goal of
eliminating racial discrimination emanating from official state
sources.47 When challenged in court, racially gerrymandered
redistricting plans are constitutionally suspect and subject to strict
scrutiny, a court’s toughest standard of constitutional review.48 A
district is racially gerrymandered if race is the predominant factor
motivating the placement of district lines.49 Proving that race was the
predominant factor in a redistricting plan requires showing “the
legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles .

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
Id.
Id. at 95.
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Id. 52(a)(6).
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985).
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241–42 (2001).
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907 (1996) (citations omitted).
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995).
Id. at 916.
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. . to racial considerations.”50 The burden of proving racial
predominance may be satisfied through either “circumstantial evidence
of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to
legislative purpose.”51 This is often easier said than done, especially in
cases where “majority-minority districts (or the approximate
equivalent) are at issue and where racial identification correlates highly
with political affiliation.”52 The Supreme Court faced such a case in
Easley v. Cromartie,53 wherein the Court found that “[t]he evidence
taken together . . . does not show that racial considerations
predominated.”54 The Court attempted to clarify the standard by
stating that “[i]n a case such as this one . . . the party attacking the
legislatively drawn boundaries must show at the least that the
legislature could have achieved its legitimate political objectives in
alternative ways that are comparably consistent with traditional
districting principles.”55
Once a districting plan is held to be a racial gerrymander under the
racial predominance standard, it becomes subject to strict scrutiny.56
Proving that the redistricting legislation is narrowly tailored to a
compelling interest is the only way for the state to satisfy strict
scrutiny.57 The Supreme Court has indicated that a racially
gerrymandered districting plan can pass strict scrutiny when the
challenged district is “reasonably necessary under the constitutional
reading and application” of federal law.58 Furthermore, a racially
gerrymandered plan may also pass strict scrutiny if a state has “a strong
basis in evidence to use racial classifications in order to comply with a
statute,” meaning “good reasons to believe such use is required, even if
a court does not find that the actions were necessary.”59 The Supreme
Court has assumed, but not decided, that a state’s interest in complying
with the VRA could justify a racially gerrymandered districting plan.60
When analyzing a VRA claim, the Court looks at whether the plan

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 257.
55. Id. at 258.
56. Miller, 515 U.S. at 920.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 921.
59. Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1274 (2015) (emphasis in original)
(quotation marks omitted).
60. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996).
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racially placed voters in certain districts to comply with section 2
prohibitions against vote dilution.61
A section 2 violation is determined by a two-part totality of the
circumstances test.62 The first part of the test requires meeting a set of
preconditions, now known as the Gingles factors.63 The preconditions
are that a minority group must be sufficiently large, politically cohesive,
and a white majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to
usually defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.64 Failure to meet any
one of the preconditions is fatal to the section 2 claim.65 If the reviewing
court finds that the VRA claims would have failed if brought against
the previous district map, it will find that a new racially gerrymandered
map does not survive strict scrutiny.66 This is what happened in the
federal district court.
III. HOLDING
The federal district court held that CD1 and CD12 in the North
Carolina 2011 redistricting plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment
because race was the predominant consideration in both districts and
the districts did not pass strict scrutiny.67 The court found that there was
no need for an alternative map to prove racial predominance because
the direct and circumstantial evidence in the case, taken as a whole,
clearly showed racial predominance.68 Assuming arguendo that a
state’s interest in complying with the VRA may justify racial
gerrymandering, the court also found that there was no strong basis in
evidence for concluding that the racially gerrymandered districts at
issue must be majority-minority districts for North Carolina to be in
compliance with the VRA.69
61. Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 605 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
62. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43–46 (1986).
63. Id. at 50–51.
64. Id.
65. Id. See also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 24 (2009) (“Majority-minority districts are
only required if all three Gingles factors are met and if § 2 applies based on a totality of the
circumstances.”).
66. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt 517 U.S. 899, 918 (1996) (“We hold, therefore, that District 12 is
not narrowly tailored to the State’s asserted interest in complying with § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.”).
67. Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 604 (M.D.N.C. 2016). It is important to note
that the district court’s opinion does not address the procedural issue of collateral estoppel
because that claim was rejected through an order in response to North Carolina’s pretrial motion
on the issue and was not raised during trial. Brief for Appellees, supra note 16, at 51.
68. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 621.
69. Id. at 622–23.
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IV. ARGUMENTS
The parties in McCrory disagree on three major questions. First,
does collateral estoppel bar the Appellees’ claims or impact the
standard of review? Second, was race the predominant factor in the
drawing of district lines in North Carolina’s CD1 and CD12? Third, if
race was the predominant factor, does its use survive strict scrutiny?
A. Does Collateral Estoppel Bar the Appellees’ Claims or Impact the
Standard of Review?
Appellants argue that the claims against North Carolina’s
redistricting plan should have been barred from federal court because
they were already decided in state court at the time the suit was filed.70
Appellants asserts that Appellees are members of the North Carolina
NAACP, and that the North Carolina NAACP’s suit in state court bars
members like Appellees from relitigating the issues in federal court.71
Even if Appellees’ claims are not precluded, Appellants argue that
fairness requires that the prior state court findings be considered when
reviewing the decision of the federal district court.72
In response, Appellees argue that the district court rejected the
collateral estoppel argument before trial, and that Appellees are not
members of the North Carolina NAACP, making claim preclusion
inapplicable to them.73 Appellees further argue that Appellants did not
properly preserve the issue of collateral estoppel for appeal, and
therefore it would be improper for the Court to review it or allow it to
affect their ruling.74
B. Did the District Court Commit Clear Error by Holding that Race
was the Predominant Factor in Drawing the District Lines for
North Carolina’s CD1 and CD12?
Appellants argue that neither CD1 nor CD12 was designed with
race as the predominant factor.75 Appellants’ main legal claim, that the
evidence was insufficient to prove racial predominance, relies heavily
on the argument that the “alternative ways” requirement outlined in
Easley requires an alternative district map in all redistricting cases
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 22–23.
Brief for Appellees, supra note 16, at 51–52.
Id.
Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 17–18.
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where a plaintiff claims districts are impermissible racial
gerrymanders.76
For CD1, Appellants claim that the lower court clearly erred in
finding racial predominance because the record did not show that
traditional redistricting principles were disregarded in order to
prioritize race.77 Appellants further claim that Appellees failed to show
racial predominance because they did not provide a required
alternative district map that met the legislature’s concerns about
complying with the VRA without relying on race as a predominant
factor.78
For CD12, Appellants claim that the lower court clearly erred in
finding racial predominance because CD12 was created with political
affiliation as the predominant factor, rather than race.79 Appellants rely
on the strong correlation between race and political affiliation to
explain how CD12 became a majority-minority district.80 According to
Appellants, the instructions given to and followed by Dr. Hofeller
demonstrate that political affiliation was the primary concern.81
Furthermore, Appellants claim the public statement made by
Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho—that CD12 was created as
a majority-minority district because of the presence of Guilford
County—merely describes the results of the redistricting plan, rather
than the motives for its creation.82 Appellants also deny that Senator
Rucho ever said he needed to ramp up the BVAP in CD12, and argue
that even if such a comment had been made, the instructions given to
Dr. Hofeller did not include a mandatory racial percentage.83
Additionally, Appellants argue that Appellees’ expert witness
testimony and reports should be disregarded because they rely on voter
registration data, rather than on actual voting results.84 Finally,
Appellants argue that Appellees’ failure to provide an alternative map
that satisfied the legislatures’ legally permissible political goals without
76. Id. at 32, 46.
77. Id. at 45.
78. Id. at 46.
79. Id. at 17.
80. Id. at 26.
81. Id. at 28–29.
82. Id. at 35–36.
83. Id. at 41–42
84. Id. at 38. Appellants also argue that the reports do not actually offer strong support for
Appellees’ argument because the results did not consistently support a finding of racial
predominance. Id. at 40.
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establishing the same majority-minority district meant that they failed
to meet their burden of proof that race predominated.85
Appellees argue that the district court ruling finding both CD1 and
CD12 were drawn with race as the predominant factor was not clear
error.86 Appellees claim that the alternative map argument relied on by
Appellants does not apply in cases where other evidence sufficiently
supports a finding that race predominated.87 For both CD1 and CD12,
Appellees offer support for the district court’s factual findings that
supported the conclusion that race predominated.
For CD1, Appellees rely on both direct and circumstantial evidence
to support the ruling of the lower court, but depend most heavily on
Dr. Hofeller’s testimony.88 According to Appellees, Dr. Hofeller’s
admission that traditional redistricting criteria were subordinated to
the goal of drawing CD1 as a majority-minority district qualified as
strong direct evidence that race predominated.89 Appellees point to
circumstantial evidence regarding the final shape and demographics of
CD1 and the surrounding districts to support the direct evidence of
racial predominance.90
For CD12, Appellees again argue that both direct and
circumstantial evidence support the district court’s finding of racial
predominance.91 Disagreeing with Appellant’s interpretation,
Appellees argue that the public statement by Senator Rucho and
Representative Lewis strongly indicates that Guilford County was
added to CD12 because that would make CD12 a majority-minority
district.92 Additionally, Appellees argue that even though Dr. Hofeller
was told to base districting decisions in CD12 on politics, he was also
told that he should make an exception for Guilford County, and to add
Guilford County to CD12 to meet the requirements of section 5 of the
VRA.93 Appellees also point to circumstantial evidence from their
experts, evidence showing that race best explains CD12’s boundaries,

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 31.
Brief for Appellees, supra note 16, at 4–5.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 18, 22.
Id. at 20.
Id.
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that they claim provides support for the district court’s finding that race
predominated in CD12.94
C. Did the District Court Commit Clear Error by Holding CD1 and
CD12 do not Survive Strict Scrutiny Review?
There is no dispute regarding CD12—Appellants provide no
argument that CD12 survives strict scrutiny—but Appellants
vigorously contest the district court’s holding that CD1 does not
survive strict scrutiny.95 Appellants argue the North Carolina
legislature had good reasons to think section 2 of the VRA required
CD1 to be drawn as a majority-minority district: the legislature
received evidence that all the Gingles factors were met,96 and Bartlett
requires the creation of majority-minority districts.97 Appellants point
to studies and testimony the legislature received stating that racially
polarized voting still happens in North Carolina’s CD1 as proof that
the second and third Gingles factors were satisfied.98 Because
Appellants argue that the correct interpretation of Bartlett requires the
creation of majority-minority districts when all the Gingles factors are
satisfied,99 they conclude that there was clearly good reason for the
legislature to create CD1 as a majority-minority district.100
Appellees argue that Appellants and the North Carolina state
legislature have misinterpreted Bartlett,101 and that the evidence relied
upon by the state legislature concerning racially polarized voting is not
the proper evidence to rely on when analyzing the third Gingles
precondition.102 Instead, argue Appellees, the legislature should have
relied on actual electoral outcomes.103 According to Appellees, the
actual electoral outcomes in the prior version of CD1 showed that the
African-American minority had high levels of success in electing their
candidates, despite not being a majority-minority district.104 Therefore,

94. Id. at 28.
95. Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 47.
96. Id. at 53.
97. Id. at 50.
98. Id. at 53. The first Gingles factor was, as Appellants put it, obviously satisfied given that
CD1 had at some point been a majority-minority district. Id. at 52.
99. Id. at 45.
100. Id. at 52.
101. Brief for Appellees, supra note 16, at 50.
102. See id. at 45 (“Consideration of past election results is the well-established means by
which courts assess whether the third Gingles precondition is met.”).
103. Id. at 40.
104. Id. at 44.
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the third Gingles factor was not satisfied, and the North Carolina
legislature did not have good reason to believe it needed to make CD1
a majority-minority district.105
V. ANALYSIS
While the evidence in this case presented a challenge to the district
court, the correct path for the Supreme Court is fairly clear. Appellants’
attempt to bar the case or modify the standard of review due to the
state court litigation is unsupported by any court precedent. While it
may seem somewhat arbitrary that the federal case happened to reach
the court on its merits first, there is no exception in Rule 52(a), which
states quite clearly that the standard of review of factual findings is for
clear error.106 Since Appellees were not a party to the state court
litigation, collateral estoppel cannot be applied, even though the case
raises similar policy concerns.107
The appropriate response to Appellants’ claim that Appellees must
provide an alternative district map is similarly clear: no map should be
required in this case. The Easley requirement that a party show
alternative ways the “legislature could have achieved its legitimate
political objectives”108 should not be interpreted to require a map. An
alternative map could be one way to show racial predominance, but
that does not make it the only way. In cases where other evidence is
sufficient to show whether or not race was the predominant factor, a
map requirement adds no value. Even in cases where an alternative
map may arguably be necessary, there is nothing to stop a legislature
from simply asserting that the proposed alternative map was politically
infeasible or insufficient, regardless of the map. The Supreme Court
should not overturn the district court ruling because of the lack of
alternative district maps.
The evidence that CD1 is an impermissible racial gerrymander is
overwhelming. The person responsible for drawing CD1 admitted to
subordinating traditional redistricting criteria to race,109 the very
definition of racial predominance.110 Appellants’ attempt to justify

105. Id. at 50.
106. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
107. See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 316–17 (2011) (holding that nonparties
being bound by prior court orders violates the rule against nonparty preclusion).
108. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001).
109. Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 612 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
110. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
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creating the gerrymander depended on interpreting Bartlett to require
majority-minority districts when the Bartlett Court specifically warned
against interpreting the case to require majority-minority districts.111
The district court’s analysis of CD12 is not as overwhelmingly
persuasive as for CD1, but because the standard of review is for clear
error, the Supreme Court should affirm that CD12 is also an
impermissible racial gerrymander. The most persuasive pieces of
evidence supporting a finding that CD12 is an impermissible racial
gerrymander are Senator Rucho’s statement saying the goal was to
increase the BVAP in CD12 and the joint public statement made by
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis explaining the placement of
Guilford County in CD12. Because Senator Rucho denies making the
statement about CD12’s BVAP, the issue becomes whether the
Supreme Court should accept the district court’s finding that the
statement did in fact happen. Credibility determinations are a
prerogative of the trial court, and “can virtually never be clear error.”112
It is not clearly unreasonable to have credited this statement, especially
given the joint public statement made about Guilford County. While
the public statement could be interpreted to be describing the results
of the redistricting or the motivation behind it, the district court’s
interpretation is not obviously incorrect. Therefore, the Supreme Court
should not overturn the district court’s conclusion that CD12 is an
impermissible racial gerrymander.
The Court will most likely uphold the findings of the lower court,
but it is possible that the Court may overturn the finding of racial
predominance in CD12. If it would apply anywhere in this case, the
“alternative ways” requirement from Easley would apply to CD12. The
Court could decide that an alternative district map should have been
required for CD12 because the evidence was not overwhelmingly
persuasive without such a map. Easley did not state exactly how
persuasive or compelling the evidence of racial predominance would
need to be before the alternative district map is no longer needed. The
Court could decide to clarify that standard in a way that favored
legislatures by requiring the map unless the other evidence is
overwhelmingly persuasive. There is no precedent to support either a
strict or loose interpretation, and so it is possible that it could go either
way. But, given the policy arguments discussed above regarding the
111. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 23 (2009) (“Our holding also should not be
interpreted to entrench majority-minority districts by statutory command.”).
112. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985).
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efficacy of the alternative district map, the Court should and likely will
decide that an alternative map was not required to prove racial
predominance in CD1 or CD12.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should affirm the district court ruling that
North Carolina’s CD1 and CD12 are the result of impermissible racial
gerrymanders. Though Appellants argue that politics and the attempts
to comply with the VRA justify the districts, the district courts findings
and conclusions are not clearly erroneous, and therefore should not be
overturned. North Carolina must remedy CD1 and CD12 of their
unconstitutional racially gerrymandered boundaries.

